Vlastimil Krivan

Biology Center andFaculty of Science Ceske Budejovice Czech Republic

vlastimil.krivan@gmail.com

www.entu.cas.cz/krivan

- 1. Distribution of a single species among two habitats: Swans and Fish
- 2. Distribution of a two fish species: A test with fish
- 3. Population dynamics and distribution of a single population: A test with bacteria growing on two sugars

1. How does ^a single population of ^a fixed size distribute in ^a heterogeneous space?

Fish distribution (Milinski, 1979)

Fig. 1: First experiment (profitability ratio 5:1): Number of fish in the less profitable half of the tank; dots are means of 8 trials with 6 fishes each measured at a 20 s clock signal; bars give standard deviations (included to give some indication of variance, though data are not normally-distributed); arrow points to start of feeding; dotted line indicates the number of fish predicted according to profitability ratio

The Parker matching principle (Parker 1978)

 $m_i = \text{abundance in the } i\text{–th patch}$

 $M=m_1+m_2 \,\,\rm{is\,\,the\,\,total\,\,abundance}$

 r_i = resource input rate in patch i

$$
V_i = \frac{\text{resource input rate}}{\text{animal abundance in the patch}} = \frac{r_i}{m_i}
$$

The population distribution: $p_i = \frac{m_i}{M} = \frac{r_i}{r_1+r_2}$

 $\textbf{Definition} \text{ (Fretwell and Lucas 1969)}. \textit{Population distribution } p = (p_1, \ldots, p_n)$ is called the Ideal Free Distribution if payoffs in the occupied habitats are the $same\;\:and\;maximal.$

$$
V_1(p_1) = \cdots = V_k(p_k) =: V^* \ge V_j(0)
$$
 for $j = k + 1, \dots, n$.

 $\text{Dual meaning of } p = (p_1, \ldots, p_n), \, p_1 + \cdots + p_n = 1 \text{:}$

1. P opulation distribution

2. For a monomorphic population it is a strategy of an individual $(p_i$ is the proportion of the lifetime an individual spends in patch $i)$

The IFD as ^a game theoretical concept: The Habitat Selection Game (Cressman and Krivan, 2006)

 $V_1(p_1) = \cdots = V_k(p_k) =: V^* \geq V_i(0)$ for $j = k+1, \cdots, n$.

Proposition. Let payoffs be negatively density dependent. Then the strategy corresponding to the Ideal Free Distribution is the Nash equilibrium of the Habitat selection game.

Proposition. Let payoffs be negatively density dependent. Then the strategy corresponding to the IFD is an ESS of the Habitat selection game.

2. How do two interacting populations of a fixed size distribute in a heterogeneous space consisting of two patches?

Gerbillus pyramidum

Gerbillus allenbyi

Northern Collared Lemming

American Brown Lemming

Tests with rodents (Rosenzweig 1979,…, Morris 1987,…)

Isolegs (Rosenzweig 1979) and Isodars (Morris 1987)

An *isoleg* is a curve in the species 1-species 2 density phase space that separates regions with qualitatively different species distributions (e.g., species 1 occupies habitat A only, species 2 occupies both habitats and similarly for species B)

FIG. 5. Preferences of Gerbillus allenbyi for the semistabilized dune (SA) drawn in a state space of activity densities of the two species (AGA, AGP). Data with AGP \lt 10 were excluded since, in this region, all G. allenbyi preferences for the semistabilized dune were > 0.40 . Preferences were divided into either SA > 0.40 (+) or $0 \leq SA \leq 0.40$ (0). The broken fading lines show our lack of confidence in the actual shape or slope of the isoleg in the regions where $AGA > 60$ or AGA < 30. For further information see Results: The isolegs: G. allenbyi.

$$
M = m_1 + m_2
$$

\n
$$
N = n_1 + n_2
$$

\n
$$
m_i = p_i M
$$

\n
$$
n_i = q_i N
$$

Species 1 payoff in habitat i : $V_i(p,q;M,N) = r_i \left(1 - \frac{p_i M}{K_i} - \frac{\alpha_i q_i N}{K_i} \right)$ $i = 1,2$ Species 2 payoff in habitat j: $W_j(p,q;M,N) = s_j \left(1 - \frac{q_j N}{L_j} - \frac{\beta_j p_j M}{L_j}\right)$ j = 1, 2.

Equal fitness lines for two competing Lotka-Volterra model

Equal payoff lines at fixed population abundances: $V_1(p,q;M,N) = V_2(p,q;M,N)$ $W_1(p,q;M,N) = W_2(p,q;M,N)$ Solid line Dotted line

Condition for the 2-species ESS for the Lotka-Volterra competition model (Krivan and Sirot, 2002; Cressman et al. 2004)

Species 1 payoff in habitat $i : V_i(p,q;M,N) = r_i \left(1 - \frac{p_i M}{K_i} - \frac{\alpha_i q_i N}{K_i}\right)$ $i = 1,2$ Species 2 payoff in habitat j: $W_j(p,q;M,N) = s_j \left(1 - \frac{q_j N}{L_i} - \frac{\beta_j p_j M}{L_i}\right)$ j = 1, 2.

Proposition. Let us assume that the interior Nash equilibrium for the distri- $\emph{bution of two competing species at population densities}$ M and N exists. If

 $r_1s_1K_2L_2(1-\alpha_1\beta_1)+r_1s_2K_2L_1(1-\alpha_1\beta_2)+r_2s_1K_1L_2(1-\alpha_2\beta_1)+r_2s_2K_1L_1(1-\alpha_2\beta_2) > 0$

Then this distributional equilibrium is a 2-species ESS.

 $\sigma =$ the relative strength of intraspecific competition to interspecific competition σ =0: interspecific competition only;

 σ =1: intraspecific competition only

$$
V_i(p,q;M,N) = r_i \left(1 - \frac{p_i \sigma M}{K_i} - \frac{\alpha_i q_i (1 - \sigma) N}{K_i} \right) \quad i = 1, 2
$$

$$
W_j(p,q;M,N) = s_j \left(1 - \frac{q_j \sigma N}{L_j} - \frac{\beta_j p_j (1 - \sigma) M}{L_j} \right) \quad j = 1, 2.
$$

 $\sigma = 0.44$

M

15

Joint distribution of two fish species (Berec et al. 2006)

Species ^M: Minnow (Tanichthys albonubes) Species ^D: Danio (Danio aequipinnatus)

Joint distribution of two fish species (Berec et al. 2006)
\nSpecies *M*: Minnow
\nSpecies *D*: Danio
\n
$$
R_i
$$
 ($i = 1, 2$) : standing food density at patch *i*
\n r_i ($i = 1, 2$) : rate of feeding in patch *i*
\n
$$
\frac{dR_1}{dt} = r_1 - (\lambda_M p_1 R_1 M + \lambda_D R_1 q_1 D)
$$
\n
$$
\frac{dR_2}{dt} = r_2 - (\lambda_M p_2 R_2 M + \lambda_D R_2 q_2 D)
$$
\nEqual fitness lines: $\lambda_M R_1 = \lambda_M R_2$
\n
$$
\lambda_D R_1 = \lambda_D R_2
$$
\n1

$$
\lambda_M R_1 = \lambda_M R_2
$$

\n
$$
\lambda_D R_1 = \lambda_D R_2
$$

\n
$$
\iff R_1 = R_2
$$

At the resource equilibrium the fish distribution satisfies:

$$
\frac{r_1}{\lambda_M p_1 M + \lambda_D q_1 D} = \frac{r_2}{\lambda_M p_2 M + \lambda_D q_2 D}
$$

And the corresponding distribution satisfies:

$$
(p_1 - \frac{r_1}{r_1 + r_2})\lambda_M M + (q_1 - \frac{r_1}{r_1 + r_2})\lambda_D D = 0
$$

-
- Joint distribution of two fish species (Berec et al. 2006)

Description:

1. Minnows are stronger competitors than Danios, because they move faster
 $(\lambda_M > \lambda_D)$. Thus, Minnows is competitively dominant species

2. Minnow
	-
	-

3. How does a single population distribute in a

heterogeneous space when it undergoes demographic changes?

Diauxie (J. Monod): microbial cells consume two or more $\substack{\text{substrates in a sequential pattern, resulting in two separate growth}}$ phases (phase I and II). During the first phase, cells preferentially metab oliz e the sugar o n w hic h it can gro w faster (often ^glucose). Only after the first sugar has been e x haus ted do the cells switc h to the second. At the time of the "diauxic shift", there is often a lag period during which cells produce the enzymes needed to metabolize the second sugar.

Lac operon: Molecular mechanism that regulates diauxic growth (F. Jacob and J. Mono d, Nobel prize 1965)

Adaptation: Evolution should result in optimal timing of the diauxic switch so tha t bacteri al fitnessmaximizes

Question: Is the lac operon evolutionarily optimized?

 S_1 , S_2 - sugar concentration (eg. glucose and lactose)

 C - bacterial population

 u_i -bacterial preference for the i −th $(u_1 + u_2 = 1, i = 1, 2)$ sugar

Fitness= per capita bacterial population growth rate i.e.,

$$
\frac{1}{C}\frac{dC}{dt} = \frac{\mu_1 S_1}{K_1 + S_1}u_1 + \frac{\mu_2 S_2}{K_2 + S_2}u_2 \mapsto \max_{u_i}
$$

The optimal strategy:

$$
\frac{\mu_1 S_1}{K_1 + S_1} > \frac{\mu_2 S_2}{K_2 + S_2} \Longrightarrow u_1 = 1
$$

$$
\frac{\mu_1 S_1}{K_1 + S_1} < \frac{\mu_2 S_2}{K_2 + S_2} \Longrightarrow u_1 = 0
$$

Michaelis-Menten batch population kinetics with optimal sugar

Growth rate parameters of Klebsiela oxytoca on single substrate (Kompala et. al. 1986)

Estimated time of switching from data given in Kompala et all (1986) and predicted time of switching from model.

Conclusion: There is no significant difference between observed times of switching and predicted times of switching. Thus, bacteria switch between different sugars at times at which their fitness is maximized. This shows that the lac operon is evolutionarily optimized.

References

Abrams, P., Cressman, R., Krivan, V. 2007. The role of behavioral dynamics in determining the patch distributions of interacting species. American Naturalist 169:505-518.

Cressman, R., Krivan, V. 2006. Migration dynamics for the Ideal Free Distribution. American Naturalist 168:384-397

Cressman, R., Krivan, V. 2012. Two-patch population models with adaptive dispersal: The effects of varying dispersal speeds. Journal of Mathematical Biology, DOI 10.1007/s00285-012-0548-3.

Krivan, V. 1997. Dynamic ideal free distribution: effects of optimal patch choice on predator-prey dynamics. American Naturalist 149:164-178.

Krivan, V., Sirot, E. 2002. Habitat selection by two competing species in a two-habitat environment. American Naturalist 160:214-234.

Krivan, V. 2008. Dispersal dynamics: Distribution of lady beetles. European Journal of Entomology 105:405-409.

Krivan, V., Sirot, E. 2002. Habitat selection by two competing species in a two-habitat environment. American Naturalist 160:214-234.

Krivan, V., Cressman, R., Schneider, C. 2008. The Ideal Free Distribution: A review and synthesis of the game theoretic perspective. Theoretical Population Biology 73:403-425.