Resource Theft and Spatial Population Dynamics

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(with Chris Cosner, Miami)



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Resource theft (I)

Lion chases prey ... lion catches prey





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Resource theft (I)

Lion chases prey ... lion catches prey





Lion fends off hyenas ... hyena steals some food





Resource theft (II)

Cheetah chases prey ... cheetah catches prey





Resource theft (II)

Cheetah chases prey ... cheetah catches prey





Lion chases cheetah off \ldots lion steals entire catch





Resource theft (III)



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 $\rightarrow\,$ Many scroungers may do poorly (few producers)

Logistic population growth

Let x(t) be the size of a population at time t. Assume

 $\dot{x} = (m - d - ax)x, \quad x(0) > 0$

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 $\rightarrow p(t) \rightarrow 0$ or $p(t) \rightarrow \frac{\phi(s)m-d}{a}$ (when s is fixed)

 \rightarrow What if *s* depends on *p* in some way?

Scrounger population growth

Let s(t) be the size of the scrounger population at time t. Assume

$$\dot{s} = [\psi(s)mp - e - bs]s$$

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$$ightarrow \phi(s) = rac{c}{s+c} \implies \psi(s) = rac{1}{s+c}$$

Producer-scrounger model

Assume

$$\dot{p} = \begin{bmatrix} \phi(s)m - d - ap \end{bmatrix} p, \quad p(0) > 0$$

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 : producers keep everything

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 $\rightarrow~c\rightarrow\infty$: producers keep everything

 $\rightarrow c > 1$: producer's share is larger (lions vs hyenas)

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$$\rightarrow c \rightarrow 0$$
 : scroungers steal everything

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 $\rightarrow\,$ What is the behavior of the dynamical system?

$$[\phi(s^*)m - d - ap^*]p^* = 0$$

$$[\psi(s^*)mp^* - e - bs^*]s^* = 0$$

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 $\rightarrow E_0 = (0,0) \quad \text{(neither species)}$ $\rightarrow E_1 = (p^+,0) \quad \text{(producer only)}$

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→ $E_0 = (0,0)$ (neither species) → $E_1 = (p^+,0)$ (producer only) • $p^+ = k = \frac{m-d}{a}$ (producer carrying capacity)

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$$[\phi(s^*)m - d - ap^*]p^* = 0$$
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 $\rightarrow E_0 = (0,0) \quad \text{(neither species)}$ $\rightarrow E_1 = (p^+,0) \quad \text{(producer only)}$ $\bullet p^+ = k = \frac{m-d}{a} \quad \text{(producer carrying capacity)}$ $\rightarrow E_2 = (p^*,s^*) \quad \text{(coexistence)}$ $\times E_3 = (0,s^+) \quad \text{(scrounger only)}$

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 $\rightarrow~{\rm If}~k<0$ then

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 $\rightarrow~{\rm If}~k<0$ then

• E_0 is globally asymptotically stable (comparison)

- \rightarrow If k < 0 then
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- $\rightarrow~{\rm If}~k>0~{\rm and}~mk < ce$ then

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- \rightarrow If k < 0 then
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- $\rightarrow~{\rm If}~k>0~{\rm and}~mk < ce$ then
 - ► *E*₀ is unstable
 - E_1 exists

- $\rightarrow~{\rm If}~k<0$ then
 - ► *E*⁰ is globally asymptotically stable (comparison)
- $\rightarrow~{\rm If}~k>0~{\rm and}~mk < ce$ then
 - ► *E*₀ is unstable
 - E_1 exists
 - ► *E*¹ is globally asymptotically stable (comparison)

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- $\rightarrow~{\rm If}~mk>ce~{\rm then}$
 - ► *E*₁ is unstable
 - ► E₂ exists
 - E_2 is globally asymptotically stable (Lyapunov function)

Role of resource (m) and monopolization (c)



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 p^+ , p^* , and s^* are increasing functions of m (left)

Role of resource (m) and monopolization (c)



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Role of resource (m) and monopolization (c)



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 $p^{+}\text{, }p^{*}\text{, and }s^{*}$ are increasing functions of m (left)

 p^+ does not depend on c (right)

 p^{\ast} is an increasing function of c

Role of resource $\left(m\right)$ and monopolization $\left(c\right)$



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- s^* has a maximum at $c = c^*$

Role of resource $\left(m\right)$ and monopolization $\left(c\right)$



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 p^+ , p^* , and s^* are increasing functions of m (left)

- p^+ does not depend on c (right)
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- ${\pmb s}^*$ has a maximum at $c=c^*$

What is the role of space?

Producer-scrounger model (spatial)

Let p(x,t) and s(x,t) denote the producer and scrounger population densities at location $x\in\Omega$ and time $t\geq 0$

Assume random movement in a closed habitat

$$\frac{\partial p}{\partial t} = d_1 \Delta p + \left[\phi(s)m(x) - d - ap\right]p, \quad x \in \Omega$$
$$\frac{\partial s}{\partial t} = d_2 \Delta s + \left[\psi(s)m(x)p - e - bs\right]s, \quad x \in \Omega$$

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 $\rightarrow m(x)$: producer resource discovery rate (spatial profile)

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- \rightarrow no-flux boundary conditions ($\partial_{\nu}p = \partial_{\nu}s = 0$ on $\partial\Omega$)

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 $\rightarrow m(x)$: producer resource discovery rate (spatial profile)

- \rightarrow d_1 and d_2 : mobilities
- \rightarrow no-flux boundary conditions ($\partial_{\nu}p = \partial_{\nu}s = 0$ on $\partial\Omega$)
- \rightarrow how do the resource m(x) and movement (d_1,d_2) combine to influence the ecological outcome?

A steady-state $\left(p^{*},s^{*}\right)$ satisfies

$$d_1 \Delta p^* + [\phi(s^*)m(x) - d - ap^*]p^* = 0, \quad x \in \Omega$$

$$d_2 \Delta s^* + \left[\psi(s^*) m(x) p^* - e - bs^* \right] s^* = 0, \quad x \in \Omega$$

with no-flux boundary conditions

$$\partial_{\nu}p^* = \partial_{\nu}s^* = 0, \quad x \in \partial\Omega$$

and is non-negative everywhere

$$p^*(x) \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad s^*(x) \geq 0, \quad x \in \Omega$$

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with no-flux boundary conditions

$$\partial_{\nu}p^* = \partial_{\nu}s^* = 0, \quad x \in \partial\Omega$$

 $x \in \Omega$

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$$p^*(x) \ge 0$$
 and $s^*(x) \ge 0,$
 $\rightarrow E_0 = (0,0)$ (neither species)
 $\rightarrow E_1 = (p^+(x),0)$ (producer only)
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$$\partial_{\nu}p^* = \partial_{\nu}s^* = 0, \quad x \in \partial\Omega$$

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$$p^*(x) \ge 0$$
 and $s^*(x) \ge 0$, $x \in \Omega$
 $\rightarrow E_0 = (0,0)$ (neither species)
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 $\rightarrow E_2 = (p^*(x), s^*(x))$ (coexistence)



Properties of $E_0 = (0, 0)$

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 E_0 always exists

Linearization of the PDE around E_0 leads to an eigenvalue problem

$$d_1 \Delta u + r(x)u = \lambda u, \quad x \in \Omega$$

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where r(x) = m(x) - d and $\partial_{\nu} u = 0$ on $\partial \Omega$.

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If $\bar{r} > 0$ then E_0 is unstable for all $d_1 > 0$

 $d_1\Delta p^+ + \left[m(x) - d - ap^+\right]p^+ = 0 \ (x \in \Omega) \quad \text{with} \quad \partial_\nu p^+ = 0 \ (x \in \partial \Omega)$

 $d_1\Delta p^+ + [m(x) - d - ap^+]p^+ = 0 \ (x \in \Omega) \quad \text{with} \quad \partial_{\nu} p^+ = 0 \ (x \in \partial \Omega)$ $E_1 \text{ exists if and only if } E_0 \text{ is unstable } (\lambda^* > 0)$

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Linearization of the PDE around E_1 results in the eigenvalue problem

$$d_2\Delta u + K(x)u = \lambda u, \quad x \in \Omega$$

where $K(x) = \psi(0)m(x)p^+(x) - e$ and $\partial_{\nu}u = 0$ on $\partial\Omega$.

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Permanence implies that E_2 exists (Cantrell-Cosner-Hutson 1993)

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Uniqueness of E_2 is a hard problem

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Uniqueness of E_2 is a hard problem

Linearization of the PDE around E_2 results in an eigenvalue problem which consists of two equations. A principal eigenvalue (σ^*) still exists, but it cannot be expressed in variational form.

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 E_2 is stable when $\sigma^* < 0$ and it is unstable when $\sigma^* > 0$.

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 E_2 is stable when $\sigma^* < 0$ and it is unstable when $\sigma^* > 0$.

If m(x) is constant then E_2 is unique and globally asymptotically stable

Slower dispersal is favored



Suppose d_1 and d_2 are replaced by d_1/ℓ and d_2/ℓ

The horizontal axis is ℓ

The vertical axis is the $L^{\infty}(\Omega)$ -norm of the steady-states E_1 and E_2

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Allow producers and scroungers to move in response to the resource and/or population densities

$$\frac{\partial p}{\partial t} = \nabla \cdot \left[d_1 \nabla p - \beta_1 p \nabla f \right] + \left[\phi(s)m - d - ap \right] p, \quad x \in \Omega$$
$$\frac{\partial s}{\partial t} = \nabla \cdot \left[d_2 \nabla s - \beta_2 s \nabla g \right] + \left[\psi(s)mp - e - bs \right] s, \quad x \in \Omega$$

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No-flux boundary conditions

$$\partial_{\nu} \left[d_1 \nabla p - \beta_1 p \nabla f \right] = \partial_{\nu} \left[d_2 \nabla s - \beta_2 s \nabla g \right] = 0, \quad x \in \partial \Omega$$

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 $\rightarrow \beta_1$, β_2 constants (sign affects interpretation)

$$\rightarrow \ f = f(m,p,s) \text{ and } g = g(m,p,s)$$

Strategies (f and g)

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0 random diffuser $m \, \operatorname{or} \, \ln m$ resource $p \text{ or } \ln p$ producer density s or $\ln s$ scrounger density $\phi(s)$ or $\psi(s)$ producer or scrounger share $\phi(s)m$ producer resource acquisition rate corporate resource discovery rate mp $\psi(s)mp$ scrounger resource acquisition rate $\phi(s)m - d - ap$ producer fitness $\psi(s)mp - e - bs$ scrounger fitness

Ecological conclusions and future work

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Happy Birthday Chris!

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